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An outbreak of avian inﬂ  uenza (H7N3) among poultry 
resulted in laboratory-conﬁ  rmed disease in 1 of 103 exposed 
persons. Incomplete use of personal protective equipment 
(PPE) was associated with conjunctivitis and inﬂ  uenza-like 
symptoms. Rigorous use of PPE by persons managing avi-
an inﬂ  uenza outbreaks may reduce exposure to potentially 
hazardous infected poultry materials.
I
n April 2006, an outbreak of avian inﬂ  uenza occurred 
on 3 poultry farms in Norfolk, England (1). Reverse 
transcription–PCR (RT-PCR) of poultry blood samples 
and cloacal swabs detected low-pathogenic avian inﬂ  uenza 
(H7N3) on 1 farm, and veterinary investigation conﬁ  rmed 
inﬂ  uenza subtype H7N3 on the 2 adjacent farms. Surveil-
lance and protection zones were established around all in-
fected premises, and all birds were culled. Persons who had 
been exposed were offered oseltamivir prophylaxis; those 
with inﬂ  uenza symptoms were offered oseltamivir treat-
ment and inﬂ  uenza vaccination. All persons at risk were 
orally instructed to wear personal protective equipment 
(PPE).
The Study
We conducted a retrospective cohort study of all per-
sons who had been potentially exposed to infectious mate-
rial by handling live and dead poultry, poultry products, or 
litter derived from infected premises. Our objective was to 
measure associations between potential exposure to infec-
tious material, completeness of use of PPE, and taking and 
timing of oseltamivir prophylaxis with having symptoms 
consistent with or conﬁ  rmed as resulting from inﬂ  uenza 
virus A (H7N3) infection. We pretested and then admin-
istered a questionnaire by telephone after poultry culling 
ended (median 66 days, range 60–143 days). For persons 
who did not respond to the questionnaire (n = 39), we ex-
tracted data recorded in the outbreak records to describe 
their activities in relation to the outbreak, their use of os-
eltamivir prophylaxis, and their seasonal inﬂ  uenza vaccine 
status. Only persons who were interviewed and completed 
the questionnaire (n = 103) were included in the statistical 
analysis. Persons were invited to provide an acute-phase 
blood sample during the outbreak and a convalescent-phase 
sample 28 days after their last potential exposure. Excep-
tions were those at low risk, e.g., incinerator workers and 
lorry drivers.
Possible case-patients were those who reported con-
junctivitis or inﬂ  uenza-like symptoms (>1 of the following: 
fever, sore throat, cough, shortness of breath, body/muscle 
pain, runny nose) in the 7 days after last potential exposure. 
Conﬁ  rmed case-patients were those for whom virus was 
detected by culture and RT-PCR of material from the con-
junctiva or respiratory tract and/or conﬁ  rmed by serologic 
testing. Inﬂ  uenza virus (H7N3) from the conjunctiva of the 
index case-patient was prepared by growth in embryonated 
eggs. Serum samples were screened by using microneutral-
ization (MN) and hemagglutination inhibition (HI) tests 
(2,3). We deﬁ  ned MN >20 as evidence of seroreactivity. 
When either test gave a positive result, we performed con-
ﬁ  rmatory Western blot analysis, using puriﬁ  ed inﬂ  uenza 
(H7N3) virus (4).
We calculated odds ratios (ORs), 95% conﬁ  dence in-
tervals (CIs), and p values for being a possible or conﬁ  rmed 
case-patient. Independent variables are shown in the on-
line Technical Appendix, Table A, available from www.
cdc.gov/EID/content/15/1/59-Techapp.pdf. All risk factors 
with p<0.2 in the single-variable analysis were initially in-
cluded in a logistic regression model and then removed, 
least signiﬁ  cant ﬁ  rst, until all had p<0.1. Confounding vari-
ables (those that caused >10% change in the ORs of covari-
ates) were retained regardless of p value.
In total, 142 persons were potentially exposed. Ques-
tionnaires were completed for 103 (73%) persons (21 could 
not be contacted, 10 declined, 7 had no contact informa-
tion, and 1 questionnaire was lost). Characteristics, po-
tential exposures, and preventive measures differed little 
between persons who did or did not complete the question-
naire (Table 1). Of 46 persons who reported symptoms, 19 
reported conjunctivitis with inﬂ  uenza-like symptoms and 
27 reported inﬂ  uenza-like symptoms only. PPE reported as 
“always used” were protective coveralls (81%), protective 
footwear (82%), disposable gloves (67%), face-ﬁ  tted mask 
(51%), other mask (24%), and protective goggles (19%) 
(online Technical Appendix, Table B).
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Atlanta, Georgia, USA.Fifty-six (54%) persons reported complete use of PPE. 
Single-variable analysis indicated that working on an in-
fected premise (OR 2.76, 95% CI 1.17–6.50) was signiﬁ  -
cantly associated with being a possible or conﬁ  rmed case-
patient (online Technical Appendix, Table A). Higher levels 
of exposure to potentially infected poultry (OR 2. 20, 95% 
CI 0.96–5.04) and only partial use compared with full use 
of PPE (OR 2.16, 95% CI 0.97–4.83) were also associated 
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Table 1. Characteristics and preventive measures taken by all persons potentially exposed to influenza A virus A (H7N3)–infected
materials
Characteristic
Completed questionnaire  
(n = 103), no. (%)*
Did not complete questionnaire 
(n = 39), no. (%)†
Male gender 81 (79) 34 (87)
Oseltamivir prophylaxis
 Yes 98 (95) 30 (77)
 No 5 (5) 6 (15)
 Unknown 3( 8 )
Seasonal influenza vaccine
  Received before outbreak 5 (5) 1 (3)
  Received during outbreak 12 (12) 1 (3)
  Received before and during outbreak 66 (64) 29 (74)
  Not received 8 (8) 2 (5)
  Unknown 12 (12) 6 (15)
Activities on infected premises‡ 65 (63) 22 (56)
  Any activity with potentially high exposure§ 62 6
 Catching  poultry 39 4
 Culling  poultry 24 7
  Inspecting or collecting biological/environmental samples 21 2
  Loading dead poultry for transport 32 0
  Disinfecting and cleaning 17 2
Activities off infected premises 38 (37) 12 (31)
 Running  incinerator  16 8
  Transporting dead poultry 10 0
  Testing biological/environmental samples 4 1
 Other 83
Activities unknown 0 5 (13)
Use of personal protective equipment¶
 Complete 56  (54) –
 Incomplete 47  (46) –
Exposure to poultry during 6 mo before outbreak
 Never 20  (19) –
 Occasional 34  (33) –
 Frequent 46  (45) –
 Unknown 3  (3) –
Symptoms reported 7 d postexposure
 Conjunctivitis  only 0 –
  Influenza-like symptoms only 27 (26) –
  Conjunctivitis and influenza-like symptoms 19 (18) –
Influenza-like symptoms# 46 (45) –
 Body/muscle  pain 23 –
 Sore  throat 22 –
 Runny  nose 16 –
 Cough 15 –
  Shortness of breath 8 –
  Fever (subjective, not measured) 5 –
*Median age (range) 40 (15–64) y. 
†Median age (range) 41 (19–74) y. 
‡For the 39 persons who did not respond to the study questionnaire, we used activities recorded in the outbreak records. Some persons had >1 exposure 
on site. 
§High exposure includes >1 of the following activities: entering poultry sheds, coming within 1 m of live poultry, handling live or dead poultry, contact with 
chicken litter or feathers, and handling eggs or egg products. 
¶Complete use of personal protective equipment defined as always using gloves, coveralls, footwear, face-fitted N95 respirator, or other mask 
(unspecified), and goggles. 
#Reported by the 27 patients with influenza-like symptoms only and the 19 with conjunctivitis and influenza-like symptoms. Risk for Avian Inﬂ  uenza (H7N3)
with being a possible or conﬁ  rmed case-patient, but 95% 
CIs were <1.0. Characteristics not associated with being a 
possible or conﬁ  rmed case-patient were age >30 years; male 
sex; being a Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs employee; smoking; having had a prior inﬂ  uenza 
vaccination; timing of starting oseltamivir prophylaxis; and 
exposure to potentially infected poultry in the preceding 
months. Multivariable analysis showed the association with 
being a possible or conﬁ  rmed case-patient to be statistically 
signiﬁ  cant for incomplete use of PPE and weakly signiﬁ  cant 
for working on an infected premise (Table 2).
Serum samples were available from 91 persons: 33 
acute- and convalescent-phase pairs, 49 acute-phase sam-
ples, and 9 convalescent-phase samples. Only the serum 
from the index case-patient showed reactivity in both the 
MN (titer 40) and HI (titer 32) tests and also showed reac-
tivity in Western blot. No acute-phase sample from this per-
son was available. All other acute- and convalescent-phase 
samples were negative in both tests. During the outbreak, 
eye, nose, and throat swabs were taken from 14 persons 
(1–8 days after symptom onset); 10 reported inﬂ  uenza-
like symptoms (2 without eye involvement), 2 reported 
no symptoms, and 2 had no clinical information available. 
Comprehensive molecular diagnostic tests for common 
human viral respiratory pathogens (enteroviruses, rhinovi-
ruses, adenoviruses, respiratory syncytial viruses, parain-
ﬂ  uenza viruses) were also performed and did not provide 
evidence of alternative causes of infection. A vaccine strain 
of avian paramyxovirus (Newcastle disease virus) was re-
covered from 1 person with conjunctivitis, which suggests 
that at least 1 case of conjunctivitis was caused by avian 
paramyxovirus. Serologic testing for seasonal inﬂ  uenza in-
fection (HI tests on all paired serum samples) did not indi-
cate any recent human infections.
Our study had a number of limitations. Because work-
ers were interviewed a minimum of 2 months after the 
outbreak, they may not have accurately recalled their ex-
posures. In addition, we relied on self-reported data. Dif-
ﬁ  culties recalling symptoms were less likely as we actively 
followed up persons for 7 days after last exposure. In the 
absence of a control group, such as farmers from nonin-
fected premises, whether the incidence of inﬂ  uenza-like 
illness and conjunctivitis in this cohort was different is 
unclear, although during the outbreak, inﬂ  uenza activity in 
the general population was low and no isolates of seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza were reported. We did not measure dust exposure 
as an alternative explanation for conjunctivitis in some or 
all persons, apart from the index case-patient who reported 
this symptom. The results from laboratory testing were lim-
ited because convalescent-phase serum was not available 
from all persons who reported inﬂ  uenza-like illness. How-
ever, a wide range of molecular diagnostic tests for human 
viral pathogens were performed on samples from persons 
who were not well at the time of the outbreak. Because the 
kinetics of appearance and disappearance of human anti-
bodies to avian inﬂ  uenza are poorly understood, timing of 
the collection of samples may not have been optimal in this 
outbreak and we may have missed the opportunity to diag-
nose some infections. Moreover, because serologic tests for 
inﬂ  uenza virus A (H7N3) may not correlate well with in-
fection (5), we could not rule out inﬂ  uenza A virus (H7N3) 
infection among symptomatic persons, even in the presence 
of convalescent-phase serum that was negative for H7.
Conclusions
Strict compliance with PPE use should be reinforced 
when outbreaks of avian inﬂ  uenza among poultry are being 
managed, as recommended in current guidance from the 
United Kingdom (6) and the European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control (7). Compliance tends to be subop-
timal (8), possibly because of low risk perception among 
poultry workers (9). Understanding what obstacles prevent 
workers from wearing complete PPE is needed. Our study 
suggests that rigorous use of PPE by persons managing 
avian inﬂ  uenza outbreaks reduces inﬂ  uenza-like symptoms 
and conjunctivitis and potentially hazardous exposure to 
infected poultry materials.
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Table 2. Multivariable analysis of factors associated with possible 
or confirmed cases* 
Factor Odds ratio 95% CI p value
Defra employee 
 No 1.00
 Yes 2.07 0.72–5.94 0.17
Working on an infected premise 
 No 1.00
 Yes 7.53 0.68–83.41 0.064
Potential exposure level 
 Low 1.00
 High 0.26 0.02–2.75 0.22
Use of personal protective equipment 
 Complete 1.00
 Incomplete 3.26 1.22–8.73 0.015
Use of oseltamivir relative to first potential exposure 
 Before 1.00
  On the same day 2.19 0.84–5.71 0.27
 After 1.33 0.29–6.09
*Based on 96 questionnaires with complete information. CI, confidence 
interval; Defra, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. References
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